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Studies on memory, imagination, and empathy have largely progressed in isolation. Conse-
quently, humans’ empathic tendencies to care about and help other people are considered
independent of our ability to remember and imagine events. Despite this theoretical auton-
omy,workfromacrosspsychology,andneurosciencesuggeststhatthesecognitiveabilities
may be linked. In the present paper, I tentatively propose that humans’ ability to vividly
imagine speciﬁc events (as supported by constructive memory) may facilitate prosocial
intentions and behavior. Evidence of a relationship between memory, imagination, and
empathy comes from research that shows imagination inﬂuences the perceived and actual
likelihood an event occurs, improves intergroup relations, and shares a neural basis with
memoryandempathy.Althoughmanyquestionsremain,thispaperoutlinesanewdirection
for research that investigates the role of imagination in promoting empathy and prosocial
behavior.
Keywords: episodic memory, episodic simulation, mental simulation, imagination, functional magnetic resonance
imaging, empathy, prosocial behavior
INTRODUCTION
Every day there are families with an inept cat marooned in a tree,
friendswithacouchtobemoved,neighbors’homesdamagedbya
storm,pedestrianshitbyacar:peopleinneedofhelp.Tothesuffer-
ers’beneﬁt,otherpeopletendtoprovideassistance,sometimesata
greatcosttopersonalwelfare(Heinetal.,2010).Partlyaccounting
for why such selﬂess behaviors exist, some researchers have pro-
posedhumans’rampantevolutionarysuccessisduetoourspecies’
abilitytounderstand,collaboratewith,andhelpothers(Tomasello,
2000; Nowak and Highﬁeld,2011). Contributing to these abilities
is our capacity for empathy. A term used to describe various con-
cepts in the social psychology literature,empathy is a multifaceted
construct that has included vicariously experiencing another per-
son’s emotions (affect-sharing), deliberately considering another
person’s perspective in order to understand their thoughts and
feelings (mentalizing), and a desire to improve another person’s
welfare (prosocial concern; Zaki and Ochsner,2012). For the pur-
poses of this paper, I use empathy to imply the latter construct,
viewing the former two as means of – but not always – eliciting
empathy and prosocial behavior (Batson,1991).
There are several factors known to modulate willingness to
help (e.g., closeness of a relationship, social norms), but predom-
inate among them is mentalizing the perspective of the person in
need. Adopting the other person’s perspective focuses our atten-
tion on how he or she is affected by an adverse situation, eliciting
an empathic feeling that then increases the perspective-taker’s
willingness to help (Batson, 1991; see, Epley et al., 2006; Barber
et al., 2010; for mentalizing conditions that elicit egotism). But
that might not always be the case. In contrast to mentalizing, a
path to facilitate helping that is less reliant on emotional con-
cern may come from episodic simulation, the ability to vividly
imagine speciﬁc personal events. While mentalizing and episodic
simulation are related in that both processes consist of a mental
shift away from the immediate environment and into hypotheti-
cal experiences (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), the content of those
hypothetical experiences differs across these processes. Whereas
mentalizing involves inferring mental states from another per-
son’sperspective,episodicsimulationinvolvesimaginingscenarios
speciﬁc in time and place from a ﬁrst-person perspective.
In recent years, the functional role of memory has extended
beyond remembering the past to include imagining the future
(Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010). One
prominent theory, the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis,
posits that the cognitive raw materials of imagined future experi-
encesarebitsandbobsof episodicmemories(SchacterandAddis,
2007,2009). The ﬂexibility of constructive memory promotes the
recombination of details gleaned across past episodic experiences
into novel representations of future events that allow individuals
to readily confront previously un-encountered situations (Schac-
teretal.,2008;Buckner,2010).Theadaptivefunctionofimagining
events is thought to mainly derive from the opportunity to “test
out” one or more versions of what might happen by simulating
the outcome of anticipated future events. Simulation reduces the
cost of engaging in behavior while supporting planning and pre-
diction, which enables humans to learn from simulated missteps
without actually lifting a foot (Buckner and Carroll,2007; Gilbert
and Wilson, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; see, Schacter, 2012
for a comprehensive review). Here, I offer an additional function
for episodic simulation that has not previously been considered:
facilitating socially desirable actions.
In what follows, I selectively piece together work from across
the cognitive and social domains of psychology and neuroscience,
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marshaling support for the role of episodic simulation in under-
standing and helping others. First, I will review studies that
demonstrate imagination’s effect on the perceived likelihood that
an event will happen,an effect that is likely to extend to imagined
helping. Second, I will then look at recent promising work that
demonstrates imagination’s positive impact on empathy biases
against dissimilar others. Third, I will brieﬂy examine the neural
basisof episodicsimulationandempathybyhighlightingoverlap-
pingbrainregionsandcontemplatethesharedcognitiveprocesses
these regions may support. Finally, I highlight what I think will
be productive avenues for future research exploring episodic
simulation’s contribution to empathy.
IMAGINING MAKES IT SO
Relief that people in need will receive is partially dependent on
the extent that others are willing to offer assistance; the more
willing someone is to help, the more likely the person in need
will gain relief. This point seems obvious, but it is easy to mis-
take self-evidence for inconsequence. While prosocial behavior is
pervasive it is by no means assured (Batson et al., 1997). Evalu-
ating one’s willingness to help in any meaningful way requires a
person to reﬂect on the perceived probability that he or she will
help someone.Although there is currently no direct evidence that
imagining helping increases willingness to help, there is relevant,
though mostly disconnected, work from the memory and social
judgment literatures.
Memory researchers have long been interested in the falli-
ble nature of memory, attempting to understand why memo-
ries are imperfect re-constructions, rather than literal reproduc-
tions, of past experiences (Bartlett, 1932; Schacter, 2001). In the
mid-1990s, studies on imagination inﬂation showed that imag-
ining a novel event increased the perceived likelihood that it
occurred in one’s past, and in some cases led to rich false mem-
ories of experiences that never occurred (Hyman and Pentland,
1996; Garry and Polaschek, 2000). Less interested in past events,
socialpsychologistshavefoundthatimagininghypotheticalevents
increases the perceived probability that the event will occur in the
future (Carroll, 1978; Anderson, 1983; Greenwald et al., 1987).
Examining decision-making heuristics, Carroll (1978) initially
demonstrated imagination’s inﬂuence on predictions. Prior to
the 1976 presidential election, subjects imagined events related
to either a Ford or Carter victory and later were instructed to
predict the likelihood that either candidate would win. The can-
didate that subjects imagined winning was rated more likely
to win.
More recent work has shown this effect for simulating speciﬁc
future social experiences (e.g., a family gathering, job interview,
or ﬁrst date). Simulating the same experience multiple times
increasedestimatesofperceivedplausibilityforfutureexperiences.
Further, ratings of simulated detail, ease, and emotional intensity
tracked with plausibility (Szpunar and Schacter, 2012). Although
relativelylittleisknownabouttheneuralbasisoftheseimagination
inﬂation effects, tentative evidence from related work on imagi-
nation suggests that activity in the precuneus may drive increased
plausibility ratings (Weiler et al., 2010). Thus, imagining (possi-
bly mediated by the precuneus) makes it so, or at least makes it
seem so.
Critical to assessing the potential contribution of imagina-
tion to helping others is to determine imagination’s inﬂuence
on actual behavior. A recent study on voting intentions found
that imagination inﬂuenced self-perceptions (including perceived
probability of voting), which subsequently inﬂuenced the like-
lihood that the subject would vote a day later (Libby et al.,
2007). Consistent with the facilitating effect of imagined behav-
ior on actual behavior, other researchers found that imagination
increased estimated willingness to subscribe to a local cable com-
pany immediately following imagining the beneﬁts and services
the company offered. Strikingly, 2–3months later, imagination-
inﬂated estimates predicted actual subscriptions (Gregory et al.,
1982, experiment 4).
Currently,itremainsunknownwhetherimagininghelpingoth-
ers will increase our willingness to help and subsequent helping
behavior. However, based on research from cognitive and social
psychology showing imagination’s facilitating effect on perceived
probabilityacrossavarietyofsituations,theeffectwilllikelyextend
to prosocial behavior. Despite an absence of research on imag-
ination inﬂation and empathy, a good deal is known about the
positive effect of imagination on intergroup relations, a topic I
turn to next.
IMAGINATION FOSTERS POSITIVE INTERGROUP RELATIONS
Human helping behavior is pervasive, but this empathic response
toalleviateanotherperson’ssufferingisdiminishedorabsentwhen
the sufferer is a member of a different social, racial, or cultural
group(Cuddyetal.,2007;Cikaraetal.,2011).Tothebettermentof
intergrouprelations,however,severaltechniqueshavebeenshown
to reduce prejudice and empathy directed at outgroup members
(Batson andAhmad,2009). One particular effective technique for
improving intergroup attitudes and reducing prejudice involves
simplyimaginingapositiveinteractionwithanoutgroupmember
(Crisp and Turner, 2009).
Imagined social contact offers a ﬂexible and relatively minimal
manipulationthatcanelicitrobustprosocialchange.Forexample,
young subjects who spent 1min imagining a positive interaction
with an elderly person showed reduced ingroup bias compared to
participants who imagined an outdoor scene or merely thought
about an outgroup member. Imagined contact reduced anxiety
about interacting with an outgroup member and increased will-
ingness to work with outgroup members (Turner et al., 2007).
Imaginedcontactmayevenpromoteintentionstoengageinfuture
contact (Husnu and Crisp, 2010), and reduce implicit prejudice
(Turner and Crisp, 2010).
While imagined contact is a useful technique for improving
intergroup relations, it is unlikely to be as effective as face-to-face
contact (Turner et al., 2007). Part of the reason for this difference
may be that direct perception leads to relevant knowledge being
more cognitively available than imagined events (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Perhaps the closer an imagined event approxi-
matesagenuinepercept(i.e.,themorecoherent,vivid,anddetailed
aneventinthemind’seye)thegreateritscognitiveandbehavioral
sway would be (Anderson, 1983; Crisp et al., 2010). Therefore, if
onecouldboostthevividnessanddetailofanimaginedintergroup
interaction, then perhaps the prosocial effectiveness of imagined
contact would be enhanced.
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Husnu and Crisp (2010) hypothesized that more elaborate
imagined contact would enhance intentions of future contact
with outgroup members and that subjective ratings of vividness
wouldmediatethisenhancement.Elaborationwasmanipulatedby
instructing subjects to speciﬁcally envision when and where they
wouldcomeintocontactwithanimaginedoutgroupmember(i.e.,
high elaboration condition) in contrast with the previously used
imaginedcontactconditionthatdidnotrequiresubjectstospecify
when and where (i.e.,low elaboration condition). The researchers
found that high elaboration increased vividness and intentions to
interactwithoutgroupmembersinthefuture.Furthermore,vivid-
nesspredictedwillingnesstointeractwhilecontrollingforchanges
inattitudeandanxiety.Themorevividanimaginedeventwas,the
greater the willingness to interact.
Interestingly, the qualities of the event that were manipulated
for the purposes of elaboration closely resemble deﬁning features
of episodicexperiences:contextualandtemporalspeciﬁcity(Tulv-
ing,2002). Based on studies of episodic memory and imagination
that have found greater hippocampal activity when more vivid
anddetailedeventsaresubjectivelyexperienced(Addisetal.,2004;
AddisandSchacter,2008),anintriguingpossibilityisthatthehip-
pocampus may instantiate the effect of vividness on intergroup
cognition.
In regards to memory and intergroup relations, Husnu and
Crisp (2010) found that – irrespective of the elaboration condi-
tion–rememberedpastexperiencespositivelypredictedvividness
of imagined events and willingness to interact with outgroup
members in the future. This makes theoretical sense if, when
constructing imagined events, bits and bobs of episodic details
are gleaned across memories. Broadly consistent with the theo-
ries on imagination and memory (Ingvar, 1979; Tulving, 1985;
Schacter and Addis, 2007), memory appears to support – or at
least to enrich – imagination.And,it would seem,in the service of
prosocial behavior. It is worth noting, however, that the imagined
contact literature has relied heavily on self-reported measures of
prosocial behavior,causing some to question the practical signiﬁ-
canceof thesemeasures(BiglerandHughes,2010).Thisemerging
literature awaits further experiments using objective behavioral
measures.Yet,evidencefromTurnerandCrisp(2010)ﬁndingpos-
itive changes in implicit prejudice reduces some of these concerns
(Crisp and Turner, 2010). Thus far, I have largely focused on psy-
chologicalevidencethatindicatesacognitiverelationshipbetween
memory,imagination,and empathy. Further support comes from
emerging evidence of a shared neural architecture.
A SHARED NEURAL BASIS
The neuroscience on memory and imagination has developed
largely independently from the neuroscience on social cognition
(broadly) and empathy (speciﬁcally). Although initial ﬁndings
from brain-damaged amnesic patients suggest that brain regions
supporting memory and imagination may not be necessary to
complete some mentalizing tasks (Rosenbaum et al., 2007), work
fromvariousclinicalpopulations(e.g.,Lombardoetal.,2007)and
neuroimaging studies demonstrate that brain systems support-
ingmemoryandimaginationmayshape empathy.Demonstrating
a link between memory for personal experiences and empathy,
Lombardo et al. (2007) found that differences in self-referential
memory between autistic patients and healthy controls disap-
peared when measures of empathy were included as a covariate
(see also Corcoran and Frith, 2003; Lee et al., 2004 for co-morbid
deﬁcits in schizophrenia). Conversely, independence across these
mentalprocessesalsoexists.Forexample,olderadultsshowdimin-
ished abilities to remember the past and imagine the future
(Addis et al., 2008; Gaesser et al., 2011), yet they exhibit pre-
served levels of trait empathy across the lifespan (Gruhn et al.,
2008). These behavioral ﬁndings underscore a complex relation-
ship between processes,suggesting that memory and imagination
may contribute to, but are distinct from, a capacity for empathy.
Here, I will brieﬂy examine preliminary neuroimaging ﬁnd-
ings that are beginning to subvert theoretical autonomy across
these processes, shedding light on a shared constellation of brain
regionswithinthedefaultnetwork,recruitedforrememberingand
imagining speciﬁc personal experiences as well as understanding
and empathizing with others. To the extent that the brain is func-
tionally localized, this anatomical overlap represents a cognitive
interactionacrossfaculties,signifyingcontributionsof onefaculty
to another or component mental processes recruited by all facul-
ties(Henson,2005;BresslerandMcIntosh,2007;HeinandKnight,
2008). These ﬁndings raise more questions than they answer and
pave the way for a promising new line of research.
While functional neuroimaging studies have provided initial
evidenceof theneuraloverlapbetweenmemory,imagination,and
socialcognitioninthedefaultnetwork(Sprengetal.,2009;Spreng
and Grady, 2010; Spreng and Mar, 2012), unexamined in these
studies is the neural relationship of memory and imagination
withempathicconcernandaction.However,recentneuroimaging
studies are beginning to uncover commonalities.
Investigating the neural conditions that facilitate prosocial
thoughts and behavior, Masten et al. (2011) found that regions
of thedefaultnetworkweremorestronglyactivatedwhensubjects
viewedsocialexclusion(i.e.,apersoninneed)duringaball-tossing
game compared to when they viewed social inclusion. Greater
activity was observed for the mPFC and precuneus when sub-
jects viewed social exclusion compared to inclusion. Further,after
controlling for trait empathy levels in an exploratory mediation
analysis, only activity in the mPFC positively predicted proso-
cial behavior (e.g., consoling the excluded player outside of the
scanner; see also Rameson et al., 2012; Waytz et al., 2012).
Investigating the neural substrates of an enhanced empathy
bias toward ingroup members relative to outgroup members,
Mathur et al. (2010) showed that, across individuals, the differ-
ence in mPFC activity when observing someone in need (e.g., in
a natural disaster) for ingroup versus outgroup members predicts
state empathy and willingness to donate money and time to help
ingroup members. Future work may want to investigate whether
instructions similar to those used in the aforementioned imag-
inedcontactliteraturewouldboostmPFCactivityandsubsequent
helping behavior.
One possible explanation for the involvement of the mPFC
across these studies on empathy comes from its role in self-
referential processing (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Psychological
research has previously demonstrated that subjects who view a
person in need as more similar to themselves show heightened
empatheticconcernforthesimilar-to-selfpersoninneed(Cialdini
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etal.,1997).NeuroimagingstudiesshowthemPFCispreferentially
activated when mentalizing about similar and psychologically
closeothers(Krienenetal.,2010;TamirandMitchell,2011;Denny
et al., 2012). Therefore, mPFC activity may support empathy to
the extent that it reﬂects a perceived self-other overlap, as greater
mPFC activity may indicate an increase in perceived self-other
similarity (Masten et al., 2011; Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012).
The preceding studies typically interpret activity within the
default network as a proxy of mentalizing processing. However,
because similar regions are activated under conditions of episodic
simulation(Schacteretal.,2008),itcouldbethecasethatthisactiv-
ity represents constructing vivid scenarios rather than simulating
thoughtsandfeelingsinsomecasesorperhapssharedcomponent
processes, such as self-referential processing. Further investiga-
tion is needed to adequately tease apart the entangled relationship
across these cognitive processes in order to characterize the inde-
pendent or interactive contributions of episodic simulation and
mentalizing to prosocial cognition and behavior.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Humans are a preeminent evolutionary success story because we
work as a horde, a cognitively sophisticated and helpful horde.
Multiple cognitive tools are thought to support our prosocial ten-
dencies(Tomasello,2000;deWaal,2008).Prominentamongthese
toolsarethecapacitytoinferothers’mentalstatesandanempathic
emotional response to others’ plights (Batson, 1991). Here I have
outlinedthespeculativepossibilitythatepisodicsimulationofspe-
ciﬁcvividandcoherentscenariosmayalsofosterhelpingbehavior.
Suggestive evidence from imagination inﬂation, imagined con-
tact, and the neuroscience of memory, imagination, and empathy
hints at a socially enhancing function for constructive memory
and imagination.
To be clear, I am not proposing the adaptive function of pro-
moting prosocial behavior to be mutually exclusive with other
proposed functions of episodic simulation (e.g., “trying out”
alternative scenarios in order to plan and predict the future).
Nor am I advocating that episodic simulation will always be
associated with prosocial behavior, but rather make the more
modest claim that it may support prosocial behavior in healthy
individuals and that promoting prosocial behavior may consti-
tute the primary advantage (Nowak and Highﬁeld, 2011). It is
likely that imagination will only be beneﬁcial to the extent that
these simulations accurately reﬂect reality. And, while simula-
tions of events can often be error prone (Dunning, 2007; Gilbert
and Wilson, 2007), I am encouraged by a recent meta-analysis
highlighting the relative accuracy of simulations (Mathieu and
Gosling, 2012). There may also be particular circumstances in
which episodic simulation could in fact reduce prosocial behav-
ior. If the content of the simulation is focused on negative
consequences associated with helping, such as damage to the
self, then simulation may reduce the likelihood of intervening.
Whether episodic simulation can be used to promote prosocial
behavior, and whether episodic simulation normally promotes
prosocial behavior are open questions of applied and theoretical
relevance.
Future research is needed to establish the parameters
under which episodic simulation may inﬂuence empathy and
prosocial behavior. Of theoretical importance will be delineat-
ing the contributions of episodic simulation from known mental
processes that inﬂuence prosocial behavior (e.g., mentalizing and
affect-sharing). It may be the case that episodic simulation facil-
itates helping as a result of interacting with perspective taking
or affect-sharing. For example, adopting a person in need’s per-
spective may very well guide imagining how to appropriately help
someone, or perhaps the facilitating effect of episodic simulation
will be partially attributed to making more cognitively available
the perspective of another person’s thoughts and feelings. How-
ever,theseinteractionsareunlikelytofullyaccountforanincrease
in willingness to help to the extent that the effect of imagina-
tion inﬂation,which holds for non-social events,and the effect of
increased temporal and contextual speciﬁcity of an event (both
of which are deﬁnitional qualities of episodic simulation but not
of mentalizing or affect-sharing) improving intentions to interact
with outgroup members extend to helping behavior.
Identifying the precise degree of independence and interaction
between the scenario construction and self-referential aspects of
episodic simulation from traditional accounts of fostering empa-
thyisparamounttodeterminingthecontributionof episodicsim-
ulation to prosocial behavior. An interesting question is whether
episodic simulation could boost prosocial behavior in the absence
of the capacity for perspective taking. One possibility is that
semantic knowledge or episodic memories of past related helping
experiences could be used to guide or inform episodic simula-
tions of helping events without relying on perspective taking. For
instances,perhapsthesemanticknowledgethatslowelderlypeople
typicallybeneﬁtfromhelpcrossingroadstriggersanepisodicsim-
ulationofhowbesttoaccompanyaspeciﬁcpersonuponobserving
anelderlyperson,caneinhand,waitingonastreetcorner,thereby
promoting prosocial behavior.
Mechanistically, it remains unknown whether the effects of
imagination will be primarily mediated by vividness and detail of
the scenario (possibly substantiated in the hippocampus and pre-
cuneus),orbyaself-otheridentitymerging(possiblysubstantiated
in the mPFC), or by some combination of the two. Specifying the
effect of emotion is also of interest. Although mentalizing is well
known to promote prosocial behavior by increasing emotional
concern for others, there is currently no empirical evidence that
the facilitating inﬂuence of imagining would also operate through
emotional concern, but this does not dismiss a role for emotion
in some capacity mediating the inﬂuence of simulation on proso-
cial behavior. Indeed, the increase in perceived likelihood that an
imagined event will occur was restricted to emotional events in
Szpunar and Schacter (2012) and imagining a positive social tone
has been integral to eliciting imagined contact effects (Crisp and
Turner, 2009).
At this point we are left to speculate and await empirical inves-
tigationtosubstantiateandcriticallyevaluatetheideasoutlinedin
this article. To the extent that a goal of society is to maximally fos-
ter these social abilities, identifying and examining all the mental
processes that inﬂuence empathy and prosocial behavior is criti-
cal. Psychology and neuroscience have already illuminated several
cognitive strategies for fostering empathy and prosocial behavior.
But I wonder if perhaps humans are equipped with at least one
more empathic tool: episodic simulation.
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